Introduction
This research investigates whether an additional Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp program) dollar per person, reduces food insecurity.
SNAP provides benefits to qualifying households to be used for purchasing food. Some have suggested that SNAP benefits may be less effective in some areas because of geographic differences in food prices (Leibtag, 2007; Nord and Hopwood, 2007) . We include food prices in our analysis to control for these differences. We find that holding food prices constant, an additional SNAP dollar reduces the probability of food insecurity by nearly 1 percent. Furthermore, we find that food prices do not in and of themselves contribute to higher food insecurity. Instead, higher food prices decrease the purchasing power of SNAP benefits, reducing food security.
Food insecure households are more likely to be SNAP participants. Previous research has investigated SNAP's ability to improve food security. Jensen (2002) notes that there is likely a positive correlation between a household's SNAP-participation decision and their food-insecurity status. Using full-information maximum likelihood, she jointly estimates limited-dependent variable equations and finds that expected SNAP benefits reduce the probability of food insecurity. Jensen must estimate "expected SNAP benefits" because her data source, the CPS-FSS, did not capture actual SNAP benefits in the 2000 survey.
1 Gunderson and Oliveira (2001) estimate two equations for SNAP participation and food security using simultaneous probit, but are unable to identify a statistically significant link between the two. Wilde and Nord (2002) exploit the longitudinal nature of the CPS-FSS to control for unobserved household heterogeneity. But, again they are unable to identify a statistically significant causal relationship between SNAP and food insecurity.
Some recent research uses instrumental variables to identify SNAP participation effects. Food insecurity status and food stamp participation are separate limited dependent-variable equations.
Heterogeneity in participation rules across states exogenously shifts the participation equation allowing the identification of the participation effect in the food insecurity equation (Yen, et al. 2008; Ratcliffe and McKernan, 2010) . Another approach uses state-level errors in payments as instruments for benefits (Myzkerezi and Mills, 2010) . These studies find a negative relationship between SNAP participation and food insecurity.
This research follows a similar approach, but differs in two ways. First, we use a natural experiment to identify a causal link between SNAP benefits and food insecurity. Recent legislation increased the maximum amount of SNAP benefits and we use this exogenous increase to identify the causal effect of increased SNAP benefits for food insecurity. While recent research finds support for the notion that SNAP participation reduces food insecurity, all prior research has not always found a negative link. This research will contribute to the body of knowledge concerning the efficacy of the program. Second, this research differs in that we identify the marginal effect of an additional SNAP dollar on the probability that a household is food insecure.
SNAP and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)
Food stamp eligibility is determined by a household's income and resources, while the perperson benefit is determined by household income and deductions for certain expenses. Eligibility guidelines require gross monthly income to be equal or less than 130 percent of the poverty level, and net income after allowable expense deductions must be at or below the poverty line. Resource guidelines require households to have assets equal to $2,000 or less, while households with elderly or disabled members may have assets equal to $3,250. 2 And, some persons are typically ineligible for food stamps regardless of income and resources, including undocumented immigrants, persons on 4 strike, and some legal immigrants in the US for less than five years. In addition, childless unemployed adults are typically limited to three months of benefits.
Maximum household benefits increase at a decreasing rate with household-size. Households with zero net-income receive the maximum benefit, while benefits are reduced from the maximum by 30 cents for each dollar of net-income. Gross income is reduced by deductions for living expenses, including a standard deduction, and deductions for medical, dependent care, child support, and shelter expenses to arrive at net income.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) affected federal food assistance in three primary areas. The ARRA expanded SNAP eligibility to jobless households with no children and increased maximum food benefits by 13.6 percent. The ARRA also provided additional funds to states for program administration. The ARRA allotted $500 million to the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) with $400 million devoted to an anticipated increase in demand for services. The ARRA provided $150 million for local agencies to support food banks, soup kitchens, and food pantries. The Act also provided funds to the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and food distribution programs on Indian Reservations. But the funds, $100 million to the NSLP and $5 million to Indian Reservations, were designated for purchase of equipment and facility upgrades and are unlikely to have an impact of food security.
Beginning in April 2009, the ARRA temporarily increased the maximum SNAP benefit by 13.6 percent. Originally, the benefit increase was set to expire when the regular rate of benefit inflation overtook it, but legislation in 2010 instead terminates the increase in November 2013. The Act also eliminated the three month limit on benefits for childless unemployed adults.
The ARRA may affect food insecurity through two avenues. SNAP participation is likely to increase because of expanded eligibility standards. But, SNAP participation might also increase because of expanded food benefits. Prior to the Act some households may have chosen not to participate, even though they were eligible, because the benefit from participating did not exceed the perceived, perhaps psychic cost, of participating in SNAP. After the Act, the enhanced benefits likely changed the cost-benefit calculation for some households leading them to participate (Nord and Prell, 2011) .
Conceptual Model
Households receive utility from food (F) and other goods (OG). Households may receive some of their food through SNAP benefits. Let S denote food items bought with SNAP benefits and let f denote food items bought with cash, and so F=f+S. Households may receive disutility from the stigma of using SNAP benefits denoted D(S). Conditioning on SNAP eligibility it seems reasonable that households do not save, and the household problem is: Given an appropriate functional form for household utility, e.g., as in a Linear Expenditure System, it is possible to rewrite demand functions as expenditures that are linear functions of prices and income. In this paper we are interested in the interaction of SNAP benefits and food insecurity and so focus on estimating SNAP demand, and assuming expenditures are linear in prices and income write it as
where is the per capita amount of SNAP benefits received by a household, x 1 is a vector of demand shift variables, and the are parameters to estimate. We are also interested in the effect of SNAP benefits for food security. Write an equation for food security as
where FI is a dichotomous indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a household is food insecure, and 0 otherwise, x 2 is a vector of exogenous variables affecting food security, and the are parameters to estimate.
Equations (2) and (3) form the basis for estimation. In principle, equation (3) could be estimated in isolation, but previous studies have established that food insecure households are more likely to be SNAP recipients and so . The strategy is to treat equations (2) and (3) as a system and because equation (3) has a dichotomous dependent variable we use an Instrumental
Variable Probit estimator.
In order to identify in equation (3), there must be at least one exogenous variable in x 1 that is not included in x 2 . In other words, there must be a variable that affects food insecurity only through its effect on SNAP benefits. By carefully choosing the sample and time period examined, the ARRA provides a natural experiment that affected food-stamp benefits but that otherwise could not have affected household food-security. Since the Act increased SNAP benefits, a dummy variable taking a value of one during the time period corresponding to the Act's implementation and zero otherwise, will shift the SNAP benefits equation (2). And, by restricting our attention to households whose food security could only be affected by the ARRA induced increase in SNAP benefits, we are able to identify for those households.
The effect of food prices can directly impact food security, through , but also indirectly through their effect on SNAP benefits, So, * . We suspect higher food prices to cause higher food insecurity and for the direct effect to be positive. We expect SNAP benefits to decrease food insecurity and for to be negative. We also expect to be negative.
Data
The 
Current Population Survey -Food Security Supplement (CPS-FSS)
We use observations from the CPS-FSS from 2008 and 2009. The benefit of using this survey is that it includes household information, including whether the household received SNAP benefits and whether the household is food secure. Importantly the survey also includes geographic indicators that can be used to match household data with price data.
In general, households in the CPS are interviewed each month for four consecutive months, then ignored for eight months, then interviewed for the same four months the following year. The FSS of the CPS is conducted in December of each year. Each household is identified by a unique number so there is a subset of CPS households that are interviewed in December 2008 that are again interviewed in December 2009. We use the unique household indicator to identify these households and include only them in the analysis. The ARRA took effect in April of 2009, so its effect for SNAP benefits will be fully implemented by December of that year.
CCER Food Prices
The We are able to match CPS-FSS households in 135 urban areas with CCER price data.
Quarterly Food at Home Database
The Price estimates are available for 26 metropolitan areas. Prices are in dollars per 100 grams of food as purchased by consumers, and take into account premiums for processing and convenience.
I use prices in the QFAHPD to construct an index of the cost of the thrifty-food-plan for a family of four, a male adult, a female adult, a child age 6 to 8 and a child age 9 to 11. I calculated the cost of the family thrift-food-plan for each household in the CPS-FSS that is located in a MSA that coincides with the market groups in the QFAHD. I then find the average annual cost of the family thrifty-food-plan, and then divide each household's food-plan cost by the annual average. A household with the average thrifty-food-plan cost would have an index value of 1. Definitions of variables are given in Table 1 . Tables 2 and 3 
Summary Statistics

Empirical Results
I present results for estimating instrumental variable probit models for equations 2 and 3 in tables 5 through 8. Results in 
Conclusion
SNAP benefits seem to have a statistically significant and negative impact on household food insecurity status. This is important because earlier studies have found mixed results in regard to household participation in SNAP and food insecurity. The results here provide more evidence for the effectiveness of the program and also provide an estimate of the marginal effect of each additional SNAP dollar. Each additional SNAP dollar, per person, decreases the probability of food insecurity by about .3 to 1 percent. Given data are available on the increase in SNAP spending and in the number of SNAP recipients, it is possible to estimate the number of persons keep from food insecurity.
A weakness of the approach here is that the ARRA instrument is an annual dummy variable that may be correlated with unobservable factors that affect food security. Continuous grocery price index from CCER. Continuous composite thrifty food plan cost index constructed using QFAHD.
Variable Name
Thrifty Food Plan Index 
